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"Forever Wdd" and Wdd Philosophy:
the Adirondacks and Environmental Ethics
BY WAYNE OUDERKIRK

Introduction
In 1858 Ralph Waldo Emerson spent
a month in the Adirondacks at Follensby
Pond with other intellectuals of the time.
Later in the nineteenth century and early
in the twentieth, the philosophers William
James, John Dewey, and other thinkers vis
ited Keene Valley many times, hiking and
camping in the area of Mt. Marcy (Schnei
der, 1997). Although some of these visi
tors wrote of the beauty of the region, or
of the challenges of hiking the High Peaks,
none produced works arguing for wilder
ness preservation or defending the intrin
sic value of nature or the rights of animals.
The absence of such philosophical
defense of nonhuman nature in the writ
ings of thinkers who obviously loved the
Adirondacks partly illustrates the fact that
in the past, in their professional works,
philosophers mostly either took nature for
granted or attempted to show how it is
inferior to humans (Des Jardins, 1997).
In the last twenty-five years, however, with
the increasing awareness of environmental
problems, philosophers have turned their
attention towards nature in order to help
discover solutions to those problems. The
result is the growing field of environmen
tal ethics, or environmental philosophy,
which began as a branch of ethics, consid
ering how ethics might be applied to envi
ronmental problems, and which has
emerged as a distinct subdiscipline of phi
losophy (Ouderkirk, 1998).
Not surprisingly, many of the themes
and theories of environmental philosophy
are relevant to the Adirondack region and
its environmental problems and concerns.
I would like to summarize some of those
theories, explaining how they relate (or do
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not relate) to the Adirondacks. But in the
second part of this essay, I will give more
concentrated attention to the current
philosophical debate about an environ
mental question that touches the heart of
one Adirondack controversy: wilderness.

An Overview of Environmental
Philosophy
Three caveats before beginning: I stress
that what follows is an abbreviation of
much complex philosophical speculation.
Such abbreviation sometimes fosters mis
understanding. I hope readers will bear
that in mind and will, when they see the
need for it, seek additional clarity in the
works cited. In addition, the scope of my
overview is limited. There are other views,
other theorists who provide alternative the
ories. I only have space to indicate some of
the diversity in the field. Finally, no one
should expect that the adoption of any
particular philosophical theory will solve
all our environmental problems, in the
Adirondacks or globally. To do so is to
misunderstand the nature and role of phi
losophy, which is to help us clarify our
concepts and practices and to develop the
ories that, functioning as explanatory
frameworks, can contribute to solutions.
It is probably too soon to write a histo
ry of environmental philosophy, but it is
clear that some of the earliest effons were
to secure recognition, in moral theory and
thus in moral discussions, for no.nhumans
(Des Jardins, 1997). Thus, there was a
great deal of attention to the question of
moral standing, that is, which entities (if
any) besides humans we should respect
morally. This remains a theme in environ
mental philosophy, but unfortunately
many nonphilosophers identify it with the
animal liberation movement, though, as
we shall see, the kinds of entities philoso
phers have proposed for moral standing

have gone well beyond individual animals.
Though they are distinct fields with dis
tinct and sometimes conflicting concerns,
there is the connection between animal
liberation and environmental philosophy
tl1at both defend the moral significance of
no.nhumans.
Animal liberation thought divides into
two strands, Peter Singer's Utilitarianism
and Tom Regan's Kantian approach. The
former says that sentience, the capacity to
feel pleasure and pain, is the ultimate crite
rion for considering a creature in moral
deliberation (Singer, 1990). The latter,
speaking in the language of rights and
duties, claims that any creature that is the
"conscious subject of a life" possesses rights
and we have a duty to respect those rights
as much as we do humans' rights (Regan,
1983). Such theories could influence
thinking about the Adirondacks in several
ways. The most obvious pertains to hunt
ing, fishing, and trapping, each of which is
prominent in Adirondack culture and each
of which animal liberation thinkers and
activists condemn.
Note that it is not a sufficient response
to either Singer or Regan to say, "We have
always hunted (or fished or trapped) so
your theories must be false." All me
thinkers we'll consider are aware mat meir
theories indicate the need to reform our
practices. The challenge is not to defend
traditions by re-asserting them but to
examine the opposing arguments to see if
they are cogent and valid.
Environmental philosophers have
done just mat with animal liberation phi
losophy and have found what they regard
as fatal weaknesses. One central concern is
endangered species. That category includes
plants, but even for endangered animal
species, animal liberation philosophy
reserves no special place, focusing exclu
sively on me welfare of individual animals.
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